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I. INTRODUCTION

There is something fundamentally American about the class action.
One can almost hear those commercials as they drift from our radios and
televisions: “If you or a loved has been harmed by . . . you may be entitled
to compensation . . . .” The class action allows the masses to have
accountability for multi-jurisdictional wrongs. It allows redress to be
swift, efficient, and applicable to all those harmed, no matter how far
away. Although the class action has been central to some of the largest
societal changes experienced in the United States, the tool has faced
constant challenges as it enters its 52nd year of modern use. 1 While the
class action has faced continued scrutiny, one recent challenge stands out
among the rest. That challenge comes in the form of the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California 2,
which suggests that money damages class actions may not proceed, absent
the forum’s specific personal jurisdiction over defendant with respect to
the claim of each absent class member. Bristol-Myers Squibb suggests that
unless the claim by each absent class member arose from defendant’s
conduct in the forum, the forum lacks personal jurisdiction to adjudicate

1. “Modern” in this case is referring to the modern promulgation of Rule 23 after the 1966
Revision. See infra Part I.A.1.
2. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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that class member’s claims against the defendant.3 That’s strong dicta, and
if courts interpret the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision to apply to absent
class members, it could threaten the nationwide money damages class
action as we have come to know it.
The Bristol-Myers Squibb Court held that the California state courts
lacked jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiffs’ claims because the claims
of the non-resident plaintiffs did not arise from, or relate to, Bristol Myers
Squibb’s contacts with the state of California. 4 However, the BristolMyers Squibb case was not a class action. Instead, it arose from the joinder
under Rule 20(a) of over 600 persons as named plaintiffs in the action. 5
This joinder formed what is known as a “mass action,” where a large
group of plaintiffs aggregate through traditional joinder rules and not
through the class action rules. Class actions were not at issue in the
Bristol-Myers Squibb case. Thus, the Supreme Court left unanswered
whether this limited personal jurisdiction analysis would apply to cases
filed in federal court. 6 In her lone dissent, Justice Sotomayor noted that
the Court’s opinion failed to address whether the ruling would be applied
to class actions where “a plaintiff injured in the forum State seeks to
represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured
there.” 7
The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb has
drastically altered the litigation playing field. Following the 8–1 decision
disavowing California’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over drug
manufacturer Bristol Myers Squibb, waves of motions to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction have begun to overwhelm plaintiffs in mass tort
actions. 8 Personal jurisdiction arguments in “mass” as opposed to “class”
actions are much more straightforward. A mass action is a large group of
aggregated plaintiffs who are all named parties to the action. On the other
hand, a class action is a procedural tool which allows a few representatives
to initiate a suit on behalf of absent class members, and comes with its
own set of rules and procedure under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.9
While both plaintiffs and defendants in mass actions have shifted their
focus to meet the jurisdictional standards outlined by the Supreme Court,
3. Id. at 1783.
4. Id. at 1779–81.
5. Id. at 1778.
6. Id. at 1784.
7. Id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
8. Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Litigation Trends 2018, at 22
https://www.weil.com/~/media/publications/alerts/2018/litigation_trends_2018_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UN2X-PRXC].
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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one major question has been left open: whether the ruling applies to class
actions.
Determining the answer to this question poses an immense challenge.
The answer could come in one of three varieties, each of which has been
embraced by the district courts that have dealt with the issue.10
Specifically, courts are divided on how to apply the opinion to the parties
representing the class and the absent class members (the parties who are
not present in the case, yet who would be bound by the judgement). First,
some courts have held that the personal jurisdiction analysis of BristolMyers Squibb is not applicable to either named class representatives or
absent class members. 11 Second, some district courts have held that the
Bristol-Myers Squibb personal jurisdiction analysis applies to named
representatives, who are in much the same position as mass action
plaintiffs, but not absent class members. 12 Finally, a small group of courts,
mostly originating from the Northern District of Illinois, have concluded
that the limiting personal jurisdiction analysis of Bristol-Myers Squibb
applies to both named representatives and absent class members—
perhaps warranting another sighting of the death of the class action, or at
least the nationwide money damages class action. 13 With its far-reaching
implications, the Seventh and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals have been
the first to offer limited guidance. 14

10. Christopher Murphy & Elizabeth Rowe, Federal Courts Diverge on Bristol-Myers and
Class Actions, LAW 360 (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1086278/federal-courtsdiverge-on-bristol-myers-and-class-actions [https://perma.cc/AS7E-B6ZH].
11. See Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL
4224723 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2017); In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litig., No.
09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017); Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv01279, 2018 WL 6460451 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018); Sloan v. General Motors, LLC, 287 F. Supp.
3d. 840 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Ochoa v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 5:17-cv-02019, 2018 WL 4998293
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2018); Tickling Keys, Inc. v. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d.
1342, (M.D. Fla. 2018); Becker v. HBN Media, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2018).
12. See Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 741 (N.D. Ill. 2018) [hereafter Al Haj I]; Molock
v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D.D.C. 2018); Lee v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co.,
No. 18-21876, 2018 WL 5633995, (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018).
13. See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018);
Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870 (N.D. Ill. 2017); In re Dental Supplies Antitrust
Lit., No. 16 Civ. 696, 2017 WL 4217115 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017); Practice Mgmt. Supp. Services
v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d. 840 (N.D. Ill. 2018); DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17
C 6125, 2018 WL 461228 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018); McDonnell v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC, No.
16 C 5011, 2017 WL 4864910, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C
1948, 2018 WL 2238191 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2018); Wenokur v. AXA Equitable Life Ins., No. CV17-00165, 2017 WL 4357916 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2017).
14. See Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 2018); Molock v. Whole Foods
Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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I conclude that the Bristol-Myers Squibb ruling should not be applied
to non-resident class members in class actions. In this Note, I will
demonstrate that there is no reason to shoehorn the Bristol-Myers Squibb
opinion to apply in class action litigation because the major concerns cited
by courts applying the opinion to absent class members’ claims are either
insignificant or adequately handled by other procedural tools. Those
concerns include: (1) a concern that nationwide class actions pose
federalism concerns; (2) challenging Rule 23 under the Rules Enabling
Act; and (3) forum shopping concerns.
In Part II, I will provide a brief history of the class action in American
practice by showing its growth as a procedural tool and the recent
restrictions on its use. This is vital to understanding the scrutiny class
actions face in current practice. Further, I will provide the framework of
important decisions regarding personal jurisdiction issued by the Supreme
Court. Both are crucial to understanding the rationale of the Bristol-Myers
Squibb opinion and its potential application to class actions.
In Part III, I will analyze the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion and show
the reasoning behind the Court’s holding. I will detail both the majority
Court and Justice Sotomayor’s analysis of California’s exercise of
specific jurisdiction and how this ruling implicates an application to class
actions. I will further demonstrate the growing district court divide in
resolving this question by detailing the three categories of decisions that
have arisen in applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to class actions.
Finally, in Part IV I will argue why the three major concerns
presented by courts applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to absent class
members are unwarranted. First, federalism concerns are not present in
federal class actions, as there are procedural safeguards ensuring a single
nationwide or multistate class does not violate due process. Second,
failing to apply a personal jurisdiction analysis to absent class members
does not modify rights in violation of the Rules Enabling Act, as the
Supreme Court affirmed use of Rule 23 in Shady Grove Orthopedic
Association. Finally, forum shopping concerns have little merit, as class
members cannot procedurally take advantage of one forum’s substantive
law to their claim, and the Class Action Fairness Act allows immediate
removal to federal forums.
Ultimately, I conclude in Part V that because these concerns are not
present or pose an insignificant risk in class actions, courts should not
apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to dismiss the claims of absent class
members.
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II. THE RECEDING POWER OF CLASS ACTIONS AND THE RESTRICTION
TO SPECIFIC JURISDICTION.
To better understand Bristol-Myers Squibb’s application to class
actions, it is important to understand two consistently developing bodies
of law: the growth and restrictions to the class action under Rule 23, and
the Supreme Court’s narrowing view of both general and specific
jurisdiction.
A.

The Growth and Recession of the American Class Action

From the modern revision of Rule 23 in 1966 through the late 1980’s,
the class action has experienced a period of great growth and optimism
for its ability to adequately handle large aggregated claims, especially
large claims against a single defendant. 15 Following large restrictions in
the early 2000’s in response to abuse of the tool, the filing of class actions
has been more closely scrutinized. 16 It is against these developments that
the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion becomes so critical for the class action’s
future.
1. The Creation, Rise, and Golden Era of the Class Action
Lawsuit (1820–1990).
The class action, tracing its origins back to English law, found its
way to the New World and was introduced through a series of treatises
issued by Justice Story in the early 19th century. 17 These treatises, while
recognizing the general rule that necessary parties to the controversy must
be present before the court, theorized one important exception:
Another exception to the general rule, as to parties, is where they are
exceedingly numerous, and it would be impracticable to join them
without almost, interminable delays and other conveniences, which
would obstruct, and probably defeat, the purpose of justice . . . . The
most usual cases arranging themselves under this head of exceptions are,
(1.) where the question is one of a common or general interest, and one
or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the whole, (2.) where the parties
form a voluntary association for public or private purposes, and those,
who sue or defend, may fairly be presumed to represent the rights and
interests of the whole, where the parties are very numerous, and though

15.
16.
17.

Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 736 (2013).
See, e.g., id.
See STEVEN YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 218–221 (1987).
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they have, or may have, separate and distinct interest; yet it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court. 18

Following these treatises, the first rule for interest-based
representation, Federal Equity Rule 48, brought a rudimentary form of the
class action into practice. 19 Subsequent caselaw demonstrated a strong
desire to apply an equitable rule to allow a party to represent others with
aligned interests when normally these absent parties would be deemed
“necessary parties” and required to be involved in the suit. 20 Federal
Equity Rule 48 (which later became Equity Rule 38) was eventually
adopted into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through Rule 23 in
1938. 21 As American society industrialized, and its economy grew larger,
our changing ways of life prompted a need for a procedural tool that would
allow small claims to be efficiently joined together into a consolidated
action. 22
The original draft of Rule 23 in 1938 brought with it a period of great
optimism for representative classes. 23 A new generation of lawyers and
scholars envisioned the class action as a procedural method to supplement
government regulatory efforts and aid in compliance. 24 Legal scholars
18. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE INCIDENTS THEREOF,
ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY, OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 78–81 (2d
ed. 1840).
19. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (16 How. 1853) (describing Federal Rules of
Equity 48 as: “For convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits
a portion of the parities in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the
same as if all were before the court.”). See also YEAZELL, supra note 17, at 238.
20. See Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 302–03 (16 How. 1853) (allowing both plaintiffs and
defendants to represent different regional branches of the Methodist Episcopal Church over objection
for “want of proper parties to maintain the suit”); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers’ &
Die Makers’ Unions Nos. 1 and 3, 90 F. 608, 617–19 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1898) (allowing labor union
leaders to represent union members in action for injunction); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356, 363–67 (1921) (noting the availability of class suits, and held that members of fraternal
organization could properly represent unnamed members in suit for dispersal of funds); United Mine
Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385–89 (1922) (recognizing that class tool could be
used to sustain judgement against miners and groups of labor organizations even though they were
unincorporated).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
22. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941) (“Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to such group
injuries for which individually they are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do
not know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive. If each is left to assert his
rights alone if and when he can, there will at best be a random and fragmentary enforcement, if there
is any at all. This result is not only unfortunate in the particular case, but it will operate seriously to
impair the deterrent effect of the sanctions which underlie much contemporary law. The problem of
fashioning an effective and inclusive group remedy is thus a major one.”).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 717; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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heralded the class action, noting that “the class suit [is] a way of redressing
group wrongs [and] is a semi-public remedy administered by the lawyer
in private practice.” 25 Rule 23 soon began to cement itself as a necessary
tool to allow private parties to organize and pursue legal violations
alongside public agencies. 26
However, practical problems with the rule still needed to be
addressed. The main issue became the original rule’s three rigid categories
of possible class actions—which were based on “the abstract nature of the
interests involved”—and how to apply a final judgement to the class. 27
These categories—”true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious,”—were early
attempts to categorize the potential types of class actions.28 The “true”
category was reserved for classes where a common right was shared
amongst all parties and the individual with the primary right refuses to
enforce that right. This allows a class member to represent all others
situated, such as shareholders of a company suing corporate officers when
the company refuses to do so.29 The “hybrid” class dealt with multiple
parties sharing individual rights, but was a form of case consolidation for
when those rights concerned a shared piece of property: a good example
being multiple creditors’ claims against a corporation in receivership.30
Finally, the “spurious” class represented parties who had individual rights,
but a common question of law or fact was shared among the class and
common relief was sought. 31 For example, multiple landowners
sustaining property damage by the single conduct of a railroad defendant
could be consolidated into a spurious class. As with the other categories,
judgment for the spurious class would only bind those who were “original
parties, who intervened, and who were in privity.” 32
Practical problems in utilizing the tool’s three categories eventually
ensued. Specifically, there was difficulty in determining exactly when a
class fit into one of the rigid categories, and once judgement was rendered,
25. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 717.
26. Id. at 721 (concluding that our system should utilize class litigation to enforce
administrative and regulatory laws, and act as a private sector supplement to these regulatory
agencies).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
28. Id.
29. James W. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised By The
Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 572–73 (1937). See RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F.
SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 233
(1985). See, e.g., Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (16 How. 1853); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
30. Moore, supra note 29, at 574. See also MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 29, at 234.
31. Moore, supra note 29, at 574–75. See also MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 29, at 234.
32. Moore, supra note 29, at 575. See also MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 29, at 234.
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how exactly to administer a judgment to the potential class members. 33
This confusion prompted commentators to question whether use of the
class tool was practical and worth the effort of attempting to determine
under what category a class fell. 34 Scholars and practitioners were
frustrated that while the “spurious” class seemed to allow flexibility, it
still only reserved judgement to parties who successfully intervened in the
action—somewhat defeating the purpose of the tool. 35
These practical problems in application of the rule led to the major
overhaul of Rule 23 in 1966. 36 In effect, the 1966 revision of Rule 23
became a proper and practical way to maintain a lawsuit representing a
class of individuals. The new Rule 23 required that judgment apply to all
individuals the court determined to be in the class, despite whether that
judgement was favorable or not. 37 Further, the 1966 revision removed the
original types of classes and allowed cases to certify as class actions so
long as they met the 23(a) certification requirements and fell into one of
three classes outlined in 23(b). 38
To meet the 23(a) requirements, a potential class must meet a set of
due process safeguards to be certified as a class. First, the class must be
so numerous that joinder under Rule 20 would be impracticable.39 Second,
the class as a whole must share common questions of law or fact. 40 Third,
the claims or defenses of the party representing the class must be typical
of the claims or defenses of the class members as a whole. 41 Finally, it
must be shown that the representative parties will “fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.” 42 These certification requirements act as

33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
34. In his 1950 lecture to University of Michigan Law School, Professor Zechariah Chafee Jr.
famously demonstrated criticism of the original Rule 23’s categories, noting: “the situation is so
tangled and bewildering that I sometimes wonder whether the world would be any the worse off if
the class-suit device had been left buried in the learned obscurity . . . .” ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR.,
SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY: FIVE LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN APRIL
18, 19, 20, 21, AND 22, 1949 at 200 (1950).
35. Compare J.W. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ⁋ 23.10 p. 3444 (2d ed. 1963) (arguing that the
spurious class was still a more efficient means of easy joinder, even if judgement was not binding on
all members involved), with FLEMING JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 500 (1963) (theorizing that having
binding judgment under the spurious class tool would be capable of handling widespread injury
caused from a single event and even race-relations problems by minimizing litigation).
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. See also MARCUS
& SHERMAN, supra note 29, at 234.
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment.
38. Id.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a)(1).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a)(2).
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a)(3).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a)(4).
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due process safeguards in using the class tool. It ensures that there are so
many parties involved that other joinder rules cannot be readily used. 43
Because questions of law, facts, claims, or defenses are shared by the class
as a whole, an individual party will not be deprived of his rights if his
controversy is represented through the class. 44 Additionally, because a
representative can adequately represent the class members’ interests, class
members are assured that their interests are adequately heard, even though
they are not present. 45 These requirements ensure that under proper
circumstances, a party may represent a larger absent class without
offending due process. 46
The new rule also prescribed three types of potential class actions.
First, the (b)(1) class was available for situations where the potential class
members all had similarly held interests in the litigation, such as
individual beneficiaries suing a trust organization. 47 Second, the (b)(2)
class allowed injunctive or declaratory relief for a class as a whole. 48
Finally, the (b)(3) class, acting as a catch-all, allowed any class to be
certified as long as “questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 49 These new certification
requirements, paired with class categories that were not as mutually
exclusive as the old rules, allowed for greater utilization of the class action
in American practice. 50
With this tool in hand, a new generation of litigators used class
actions to give injured plaintiffs an efficient forum for redress, just as the
early adopters had envisioned. 51 This is especially so with the (b)(3)
money damages class, which allowed plaintiffs who had small claims to

43. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(3).
45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
46. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierre, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 182 n.27 (3d
Cir. 2001) (explaining that the Rule 23 certification perquisites demonstrate that it would not offend
due process to commence the action without the class members being present. “The rule thus
represents a measured response to the issues of how the due process rights of absentee interests can
be protected and how absentees’ represented status can be reconciled with a litigation system
premised on traditional bipolar litigation.”).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
50. MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 29, at 235.
51. See generally Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 22.
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aggregate and pool resources against a single defendant. 52 In this spirit,
the modern class action tackled some of American society’s biggest woes,
including widespread racial segregation of public schools, 53 a women’s
access to contraceptive options, 54 discrimination in the workplace, 55 and
harm to both humans and the environment. 56 While class litigants enjoyed
a long golden period, the procedural tool would soon enter a new period
of heightened scrutiny and restriction.
2. The Receding Power of Class Actions, and Growing
Restrictions (1990 to Present).
Starting in the 1990’s, the class action began losing the wide latitude
it had enjoyed in earlier decades. Several key pieces of rule revisions,
legislation, and federal circuit court opinions scrutinized the procedural
mechanisms and added new hoops to jump through for class actions.
While many of these changes are beyond the scope of this Note, two
changes are worth discussing.
a. Rule 23(f) allowing interlocutory appeal of certification
decisions.
The first major change came through the 1998 revision of Rule 23 to
add section 23(f). 57 Prior to the 1998 amendment, parties could rarely
appeal a court order granting or denying class certification. 58 As a result,
following class certification, defendants were far more likely to settle the
claims to avoid costly litigation and a potentially unfavorable
judgement. 59 The 1998 amendment to Rule 23 added 23(f), which gave
broad discretion to federal appellate courts to grant interlocutory appeals

52. See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) (noting the
revisions creating the (b)(3) money damages class “provide[d] means of vindicating the rights of
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into
court at all”). See also Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (stating “The
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries
do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A
class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into
something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”) (internal citations omitted).
53. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997).
56. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145 (2nd Cir. 1987); In re
Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mex., 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. La. 2011).
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1998 amendment.
58. Klonoff, supra note 15, at 739.
59. Id.
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to contested orders granting or denying class certification. 60 With a new
tool to immediately appeal orders granting or denying certification, parties
were far more likely to appeal certification issues and receive guidance
from appellate courts.
This rule change had the inadvertent effect of adding heightened
scrutiny to the filing and certification of class actions. Rule 23(f) opened
the door for the federal appellate courts to weigh in on Rule 23’s
procedural requirements. This has led to hundreds of opinions clarifying
the Rule 23 requirements for class actions. 61 Numerous opinions have
added heightened scrutiny regarding the threshold requirements of class
certification, and this new caselaw has made it increasingly difficult to
successfully certify class actions. 62 As Robert Klonoff outlines in his
work, The Decline of Class Actions, now that federal appellate courts have
gained greater exposure to decide certification issues, “they have adopted
troublesome new standards applicable to plaintiffs seeking class wide
relief.” 63 These developments include new standards and caselaw
applying to threshold evidentiary burdens, class definitions, numerosity
requirements, commonality requirements, adequacy of representation,
and predominance requirements. 64 As Klonoff further details: “the Rule
23(a) and (b) criteria, by their terms, have not changed in any significant
way since 1966, but some courts have become increasingly skeptical in
reviewing whether a particular case satisfies those requirements.” 65
District courts continue to struggle with these heightened scrutiny levels,
and certain jurisdictions have become more favorable for the certifying of
class actions. 66
b. The 2005 Class Action Fairness Act opened federal courts
to hear more class actions.
Congress’s enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)
drastically altered the potential forums available for class litigation and
opened up the federal forum to preside over most substantial class actions.
CAFA reworked the standards for diversity jurisdiction for class actions
and ensured that parties could either file or remove class actions to federal
court so long as there was minimal diversity between the parties, and the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
Klonoff, supra note 15, at 745–46.
Id. at 745–815.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 746, 745–815.
Id. at 746–47.
Id. at 828.
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amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 67 This change was inspired
both by accounts of abuse of the class action from state court judges
permitting easy certification of nationwide classes in state forums and the
particular difficulty of removing class actions to the federal courts based
upon diversity jurisdiction. 68 This resulted in a change of viable forums to
file as “the vast majority of significant class actions were heard in federal
court.” 69
B.

The Supreme Court’s evolving interpretation of personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.

While Bristol-Myers Squibb is first and foremost about California’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction, the decision has created implications for
class actions. It is therefore useful to understand the Supreme Court’s
continuing interpretation of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause to understand Bristol-Myers Squibb’s development.
In the 74 years since the delivery of its seminal decision in
International Shoe, the Supreme Court has limited the application of both
general and specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction was the first to be
majorly restrained through the Court’s opinion in Goodyear and
Bauman. 70 There, the Court added additional scrutiny to the requirements
of general jurisdiction by requiring that a defendant’s continuous and
systematic contact with the forum render it “essentially at home.” 71 This
was a drastic step, and it widely limited the available forums available
under general jurisdiction. 72 As most commentators believed that specific
jurisdiction would pick up the slack, it too faced restrictions by the Court.
The Court’s first restriction to specific jurisdiction came with requiring
that the defendant must have purposefully availed himself to the
jurisdiction. 73 As caselaw developed, the Court began to limit what factors
it looked to in determining specific jurisdiction, and the fairness factors
inherent in International Shoe began to take a back seat to a strict analysis
of the defendant’s contact with the forum and the “relatedness” of the
67. See 28 U.S.C. 1332 (d)(2)(A)–(C) (2018); 28 U.S.C. 1453 (2018); 28 U.S.C. 1711–1715
(2018).
68. Klonoff, supra note 15, at 743–45.
69. Id. at 745.
70. Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal Jurisdiction,
68 SMU L. REV. 107, 107–08 (2015). See also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
71. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929; Bauman, 571 U.S. at 139.
72. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium
in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 214 (2015).
73. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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claims to that contact. 74 This restriction of specific jurisdiction culminated
in Bristol-Myers Squibb, where the majority Court failed to take fairness
factors into consideration and instead relied upon a strict analysis of the
relatedness of the claims to the defendants’ contact in California.75
Any discussion of personal jurisdiction logically starts with
International Shoe. Here, in its seminal decision, the Supreme Court
determined that to subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum, “he
[must] have certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’” 76 From these contacts we derive either general jurisdiction,
when the contacts are so substantial and continuous that defendant may
be sued for any claim, 77 and specific jurisdiction, where the claims must
arise out of and relate to the defendant’s specific contact with the forum. 78
Both doctrines have evolved over the decades as the Court has continued
to modify and interpret its holding in International Shoe.
1. The Restriction of General Jurisdiction.
General jurisdiction was originally quite broad. As stated in
International Shoe, general jurisdiction was based around the notion that
a defendant’s contact with a jurisdiction was so systematic and continuous
that claims unrelated to that contact could be brought in that forum. 79 It
followed that as long as a defendant had continuous and systematic
contact with the forum, say a large corporation who operates regionally,
they could be sued for any claim in those forums. However, early Supreme
Court opinions began to limit this broad exercise of jurisdiction.
Specifically, the Court in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company held that when exercising jurisdiction over claims unrelated to
the defendant’s contact in the forum, the central inquiry is whether the
defendant’s contact was “sufficiently substantial and of such a nature” to
comport with due process. 80 In Perkins, the Court used this inquiry to
determine whether a Philippine mining company whose operations were
halted by the Japanese occupation during the Second World War had
substantial and continuous connection to Ohio when the interim president

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284–89 (2014).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Id. at 317.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 318.
Perkins v. Benguet Cons. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
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operated the company from offices in Ohio. 81 Because the operations of
the company had been fully relocated to Ohio, this justified the exercise
of general jurisdiction by the Ohio courts.82
This holding was echoed by the Court in Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall. The Court returned to Perkins to characterize the
type of substantial and continuous contacts with the forum required to
subject a defendant to general jurisdiction. While a foreign corporation
had purchases “occurring at regular intervals” in Texas and had sent
personnel for training in the state, this was insufficient to create general
jurisdiction over them. 83 Thus, both the Perkins and Helicopteros Court
recognized that even under the broad language of International Shoe,
general jurisdiction had its outer limits.
This ebb became final in 2014 when the Court drastically restricted
what forums were available for an assertion of general jurisdiction. This
came through the Court’s dual opinions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler AG v. Bauman. In Goodyear, the
Court declined to find that North Carolina could exercise general
jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary of the Goodyear Corporation simply
because they had continually conducted business in North Carolina. 84
Relying upon its decisions in Perkins and Helicopteros, the Court
concluded that “unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime
business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at
home in North Carolina.” 85 Further, the court reiterated that the foreign
subsidiary’s “attenuated connections to the State” resembled those in
Helicopteros, and fell short of “the continuous and systematic general
business contacts” necessary to create general jurisdiction. 86
The Court echoed this restriction in Bauman. There, the Court held
that California could not exercise general jurisdiction over Daimler AG, a
publicly traded German corporation, because of the forum contact of its
subsidiary (Mercedes-Benz USA) in California. 87 The Court reiterated
that under International Shoe, the main inquiry is whether “instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state are so substantial
and of such a nature as to justify suit on cause of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” 88 Returning to Goodyear,
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 448.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984).
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011).
Id. at 929 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416).
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014).
Id. at 138 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
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the critical inquiry for general jurisdiction is what “affiliations with the
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant]
essentially at home in the forum State.” 89 These limited available
jurisdictions were proffered by the Court in Bauman as an “individual’s
domicile” or, for a corporation, “the place of incorporation and principle
place of business.” 90
In the wake of Goodyear and Bauman, general jurisdiction had been
drastically reduced. 91 General jurisdiction had once been based on simple
systematic and continuous contact, and in that form, many nationwide
corporations could be subject to suit in all 50 states. 92 General jurisdiction
was now characterized by where the defendant was “essentially at home”
and generally limited available forums to the state of domicile for
individuals or state of incorporation/principle place of business for
corporations. 93 However, this limitation to general jurisdiction was
originally envisioned to be supplemented with an expansion of specific
jurisdiction. 94 This expansion of specific jurisdiction never came: the
doctrine of specific jurisdiction similarly became restricted from its
original view under International Shoe.
2. The Restriction of Specific Jurisdiction.
International Shoe originally held that specific jurisdiction could be
exercised over a defendant so long as the defendant had some contact with
the forum and the claim “arise[s] out of or are connected with the activities
within the state.” 95 In the same breath, the Court noted that this inquiry
was not to be “simply mechanical or quantitative,” but “whether due
process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which
it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” 96 It was originally
thought that specific jurisdiction, while relating to the contact the
defendant had with the jurisdiction, could still be found depending upon
the nature of the case and the types of contact defendant had with the

89. Id. at 139 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919) (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 137.
91. Genetin, supra note 70, at 108.
92. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 72, at 6.
93. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; Bauman, 571 U.S. at 139.
94. Genetin, supra note 70, at 114 (citing Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1141–45, 1177–79 (1966)).
95. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
96. Id.
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jurisdiction. Early commentators to International Shoe noted that the
court should take into consideration other factors, including:
(1) the character of the defendant’s activity that led to the controversy,
which included the nature of the claim at issue; (2) whether the
defendant was “a corporation [ ] whose economic activities and legal
involvements were pervasively multistate” or “a natural . . . person
whose economic activities and legal involvements were essentially
local;” (3) whether the “defendant’s activity foreseeably involved the
risk of harm to individuals in communities other than his own”; (4)
whether the plaintiff was a nonresident, or whether “[the plaintiff’s] . . .
affairs . . . were spread out over several jurisdictions including the
defendant’s home;” and (5) “litigational and enforcement” issues such
as the convenience of witnesses and ease of determining controlling
law. 97

Following International Shoe, specific jurisdiction slowly became
restricted. In Hanson v. Denkla, the Court added the requirement that to
satisfy minimum contacts, the defendant must have “purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its law.” 98 As explained in WorldWide Volkswagen v. Woodson, this requirement of purposeful availment
was added for two major concerns. First, purposeful availment acts as a
safeguard to interstate federalism concerns by “divest[ing] the State of its
power to render a valid judgment,” even if that forum would be reasonable
to handle the claim. 99 Second, a purposeful availment requirement gives
“clear notice” that a defendant would be subject to suit in that particular
state in relation to his contact there. 100 It should be noted that this
requirement was not originally outlined in International Shoe and acts as
a restriction on the doctrine of specific jurisdiction. 101
The Court then began to scrutinize the “relatedness” of the claims in
question but provided no clear analysis as to what constituted claims
related to the defendant’s contact. 102 Helicopteros originally noted that
the parties conceded to the fact that the claims did not “arise out of” and
were not “related to” the defendant’s forum activities. 103 The Court noted

97. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 94, at 1164, 1166–69.
98. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
99. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (citing Hanson,
357 U.S. at 254). See also Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–54.
100. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297.
101. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
102. Genetin, supra note 70, at 115–16.
103. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.10 (1984).
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the confusion and lack of clear standard to the relatedness requirement,
yet declined to address the issue in that case. 104
The final major restriction to personal jurisdiction came through the
Court’s opinion in Walden v. Fiore. There, the Court noted that the critical
inquiry in determining specific jurisdiction was “the relationship between
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” 105 The Court did look to the
quality and nature of defendant’s contact with the forum as instructed by
International Shoe, but they did so through the lens of the defendant’s
actions that connected him to the forum. 106 Thus, the Court diminished
the fairness factors analysis and instead focused on interstate federalism
and a strict contact analysis to drive personal jurisdiction. 107
This limitation of general jurisdiction and subsequent limitation to
specific jurisdiction has large and far reaching implications. As noted,
general jurisdiction was once broad enough to allow nationwide
corporations who operate in multiple states to be subject to general
jurisdiction simply because of their continuous and systematic contact
with the forum. 108 Goodyear and Bauman limited available general
jurisdiction forums to only the select few forums where there are such
continuous and systematic contacts to render the defendant “essentially at
home.” 109 As noted, commentators expected a limitation of general
jurisdiction would be followed by a broadening of specific jurisdiction to
correct for this limitation. 110 Instead, specific jurisdiction has found itself
restricted as well; whether it be from the requirements that the defendant
purposefully availed himself to the forum, or scrutinizing only the
defendant’s connection to the forum and focusing on interstate federalism
as the primary driver behind the personal jurisdiction analysis. 111
In their piece, Toward a New Equilibrium for Personal Jurisdiction,
Charles “Rocky” Rhodes and Cassandra Burke Robertson note why this
limitation of general and specific jurisdiction is so important. 112 Both

104. Id.
105. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Mag. Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 775 (1984)).
106. Id. at 288–89. See also Genetin, supra note 70, at 152.
107. Genetin, supra note 70, at 152.
108. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 72, at 6.
109. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014).
110. Genetin, supra note 70, at 152.
111. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 440 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
112. See generally Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 72.
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authors in 2014 pointed to the precise problem that is the central issue to
this Note. 113 They state:
Plaintiffs who want to litigate outside of the defendant’s home states
will look for a jurisdictional hook, and they will be highly incentivized
to do so: nationwide class actions, for example, often depend on the
existence of general jurisdiction, since the cases typically involve
multiple defendants with different home states. Now, plaintiffs will be
searching for new jurisdictional grounds . . . . As a result, plaintiffs will
work harder to establish another ground for personal jurisdiction,
forcing courts to clarify and resolve some of the remaining questions
about the scope of personal jurisdiction. 114

The elimination of broad general jurisdiction, restriction of specific
jurisdiction, and the growth and subsequent restriction of class actions
form the background of the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion. It was against
these restrictions that the Court had to decide an issue exactly on point to
the hypothetical proposed by Rhodes and Robertson. 115 Will the
nationwide money damages class fail, not because class action procedure
is inappropriate, but because the claims of the absent class members are
not related to the defendant’s substantial contacts with the forum? While
this question was not addressed in Bristol-Myers Squibb, certainly it must
have been contemplated by the Justices.
III. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB’S WORRISOME APPLICATION TO CLASS
ACTIONS.
A.

The Court’s analysis in Bristol-Myers Squibb

Bristol-Myers Squibb centered around personal jurisdiction, but the
opinion issued by the Court has had implications for class actions and has
led to a standard that the federal district courts have struggled to apply.
Bristol Myers Squibb, a large American pharmaceutical company
incorporated in Delaware with its headquarters in New York, produced
the drug Plavix. 116 The company did not produce or manufacture Plavix
in the state of California, but it received more than one percent of its total
nationwide sales revenue from drug sales in California.117 In 2012, a
group of 678 plaintiffs filed eight separate amended complaints in the San
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 20–21.
Id.
Id.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1777–78 (2017).
Id.
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Francisco Superior Court alleging that Plavix had damaged their health. 118
The group of plaintiffs brought 13 claims under California law, including
products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and misleading
advertising. 119 Importantly, these plaintiffs consisted of a large inter-state
group—86 California residents and over 592 other plaintiffs from 33 other
states. 120 The plaintiffs’ contacts with California are critical to the issues
in this case; while the resident plaintiffs purchased and were injured by
Plavix in California, the non-resident plaintiffs did not allege that they
bought or were injured by the drug in California. 121
Bristol Myers Squibb immediately moved to quash service of
summons on the non-resident’s claims by asserting the California courts
lacked personal jurisdiction regarding the non-resident’s claims. 122 This
issue would be the main contention of the litigation and would be the
subject of multiple appeals and eventual review by the Supreme Court.
Originally, the California Superior Court denied Bristol Myers
Squibb’s motion, claiming that the California courts could exercise
general jurisdiction over the company. 123 The California Court of
Appeals, while disagreeing with the Superior Court’s finding of general
jurisdiction, believed that the California courts had specific jurisdiction
over the non-resident’s claims. 124 The appellate court believed that while
general jurisdiction was lacking, specific jurisdiction was met because
Bristol Myers Squibb had such continuous contact with California and all
the plaintiffs were harmed in the course of identical nationwide
conduct. 125 Under this “sliding scale” approach, the court found that
Bristol Myers Squibb had established minimum contacts by deriving a
substantial amount of economic benefits from the State and an extensive
physical presence. 126 Further, the court found a “substantial” relationship
between Bristol Myers Squibb’s contact with California and the nonresident claims because, while the non-resident plaintiffs were not harmed
in California, their injuries resulted from a nationwide course of action by

118. Id. at 1778 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.5th 783, 790–91
(2017)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (finding California Superior Courts could exercise general jurisdiction “[b]ecause [it]
engages in extensive activities in California.”).
124. Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014)).
125. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 175 Cal.Rptr.3d at 434–35.
126. Id. at 433.
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the drug company that was identical to all the plaintiffs. 127 Bristol Myers
Squibb again appealed this determination.
The Supreme Court of California eventually weighed in on the issue.
The majority court agreed with the appellate court, stating that under a
“sliding scale approach” to contacts with the forum, the state had personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident claims. 128 Under this approach, the more
contact the defendant had with the forum (even if it was unrelated to the
claim at hand), the “more readily is shown the connection between the
forum contacts and the claim.” 129 Using this sliding scale approach, the
majority believed that because the company had extensive contacts with
California, this had moved Bristol Myers Squibb “up the scale,” and
afforded plaintiffs an exercise of specific jurisdiction “based on a less
direct connection between Bristol Myers Squibb’s forum activities and
plaintiffs’ claims that might otherwise be required.” 130 The court therefore
believed that since the claims of the non-resident plaintiffs were based on
the same nationwide conduct, and the California plaintiff’s jurisdiction
was uncontested, specific jurisdiction had been met. 131
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether this exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper. 132 The 8–1
majority decision, authored by Justice Alito, disagreed with the California
Supreme Court’s holding that California could exercise specific
jurisdiction over Bristol Myers Squibb regarding the non-resident
claims. 133 The Court believed that California’s application of a “slidingscale approach” to relax the traditional standards of specific jurisdiction
was incorrect, as an analysis of specific jurisdiction requires a nexus
between the claims at hand, and the underlying contacts defendant had
with the jurisdiction. 134 The defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff or
third party alone will not be a basis for specific jurisdiction.135 In their
analysis, the Court noted that above all other factors, precedent requires
that for specific jurisdiction to be found, there must be an underlying
connection between the forum and the claims. 136 Thus, the Court did not
127. Id. at 434.
128. Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.5th 786, 806 (2017)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1779 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 1 Cal.5th 783 at 803–06).
131. Id.
132. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (order granting writ
of certiorari).
133. Id. at 1783.
134. Id. at 1781 (emphasis added). See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
135. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014).
136. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
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believe that the non-resident plaintiff’s claims related to Bristol Myers
Squibb’s contact in California: their alleged injury occurred entirely
elsewhere, and the fact that the claims are materially identical to the
resident plaintiffs does not create jurisdiction. 137
Having determined that the non-residents could not rely upon the
claims of the resident plaintiffs, the Court determined that the connection
between the non-resident claims and California were almost nonexistent. 138 These plaintiffs were not California residents, claimed no
harm within the State, and all the relevant activity leading up to their
claims happened elsewhere. 139 Returning to Goodyear, the Court noted
that “a corporation’s continuous activity of some sorts within a state . . .
is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to
suits unrelated to that activity.” 140 Bristol Myers Squibb’s continuous
economic activity within California was insufficient to create jurisdiction
for claims that are not directly related to that contact. Therefore,
determining California had specific jurisdiction over their claims would
be incompatible with due process. 141
Justice Sotomayor, authoring the lone dissenting opinion in the case,
expressed deep concerns with the majority’s conclusions. She believed
that while the majority Court focused on defendant’s contacts with the
forum as the central inquiry, they failed to address reasonableness as a
separate core concern. In applying specific jurisdiction, three separate
inquiries are required: whether the defendant purposefully availed himself
to the forum, 142 whether the plaintiff’s claim arises out of or relates to the
defendant’s contact with the forum, 143 and whether “the exercise of
jurisdiction [is] reasonable under the circumstances.” 144 Under these
parameters, Justice Sotomayor believed that the California courts had
properly exercised specific jurisdiction.
First, Bristol Myers Squibb’s adequately availed itself to California
as a forum by engaging in the state economy, contracting with distributors
in the state, and deriving a substantial amount of its revenues from the
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1782. See also Walden, 571 U.S. at 286.
139. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1782.
140. Id. at 1781 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 931) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
141. Id. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
142. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1785–86 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011)).
143. Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
144. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. Cal., 480 U.S.
102, 113–14 (1987)) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985)).
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state. 145 Second, the non-resident claims related to Bristol Myer Squibb’s
California conduct because all the claims dealt with a nationwide course
of identical advertising and distribution of drugs across all 50 states.146
Just because the non-resident plaintiffs were injured in another state, their
claims still relate to “the same essential acts” of Bristol Myers Squibb that
also injured plaintiffs in California. 147 Accordingly, precedent requires
“no connection more direct than that.” 148 While the majority Court relied
upon Walden to demonstrate that the non-resident claims did not relate to
Bristol Myers Squibb’s California contact, this was incorrect as Walden
dealt with “purposeful availment” rather than the requirement that “a
plaintiff’s claim ‘arise out of or relate to’ a defendant’s forum contacts.”149
Third, California’s exercise of jurisdiction over Bristol Myers
Squibb was reasonable. Both Bristol Myers Squibb and the plaintiffs in
the case had a strong interest in litigating together in California.150 Bristol
Myers Squibb would have to defend only one action compared to
numerous piecemeal actions, and plaintiffs had an interest in pooling
resources under shared counsel to “maximize recoveries on claims that
may be too small to bring on their own.” 151 Additionally, California had
an interest in efficiently handling matters that concerned its residents and
a non-resident corporation doing business within its borders. 152 Taking all
three factors into consideration, exercising jurisdiction over Bristol Myers
Squibb in California did not offend due process. 153
Having shown that an exercise of jurisdiction over Bristol Myers
Squibb would comport with due process, Justice Sotomayor noted that the
majority seemed to rely upon federalism as a central concern. 154 By
relying upon World-Wide Volkswagen, the majority seemed to suggest
that “‘Territorial limitations on the power of the respective States’ . . .
may—and today do—trump . . . concerns about fairness to the
parties.’” 155 The majority Court would suggest that even in situations
where all the fairness factors weigh toward finding jurisdiction,

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
(2017)).

Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1786–87 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing internally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780
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federalism concerns bar a finding of jurisdiction. 156 Considering Bristol
Myers Squibb was engaged in a nationwide course of marketing Plavix,
Justice Sotomayor argued no single state had an interest in the controversy
and relying upon a strict federalism analysis was unwarranted.157 Noting
a departure from the usual standard, she stated: “I would measure
jurisdiction first and foremost by the yardstick set out in International
Shoe—’fair play and substantial justice.’ The majority’s opinion casts that
settled principle aside.” 158
Justice Sotomayor concluded by noting a concern for the Court’s
limitation on consolidated actions against a defendant who engaged in a
single nationwide course of action. 159 She feared that these limitations
would prevent nationwide consolidated claims by restricting plaintiffs to
filing either in “far flung” forums where a defendant has general
jurisdiction or bringing their claims separately in multiple state actions. 160
This concern extended to nationwide class actions, with the Justice noting:
“[T]he Court today does not confront the question whether its opinion
here would also apply to a class action in which a plaintiff injured in the
forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of
who were injured there.” 161
B.

The confusion in applying the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion to
class actions, and the growing district court divide.

The Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion is another important case setting
the limits on a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. However, the
language of the opinion has worrisome implications to class actions, as it
would allow absent class members’ claims to be dismissed as if they were
normal parties to an action. 162 In the three years following the opinion, a
156. Id. (citing internally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81).
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
159. Id. at 1789.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1789 n.4. See also Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002) (stating “nonamed
class members . . . may be parties for some purposes and not for others”); see also Diane P. Wood,
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 616–617 (1987).
162. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (2017) (stating “As we have explained,
‘a defendant’s relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction.’ This remains true even when third parties (here the plaintiffs who reside in California)
can bring claims similar to those brought by the nonresidents.” (internal citations omitted)); Further,
the Court entertains Respondent’s argument under Schutts which concerned personal jurisdiction
analysis in class actions. Had the Court not had their eyes set on potentially applying the opinion to
class actions, they would have dismissed the citation as totally irrelevant because it concerned a class
action, rather than a mass action. See id. at 1782–83.
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host of federal district courts have entertained motions to dismiss class
action claims based upon a personal jurisdiction analysis originating from
Bristol-Myers Squibb. 163 These courts have issued differing decisions
regarding whether the opinion can be applied to class actions, and to what
degree.
Three major categories of district court decisions have emerged. First
are the courts that believe that Bristol-Myers Squibb has no application to
absent class members in class actions because of the material differences
between the mass actions and class litigation. Second are the courts which
apply a “hybrid” approach, where the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion may
be applied to named representatives of the class, but not to the potential
class members. Finally, certain courts have applied the opinion to absent
class members in class actions, allowing a defendant to limit class size to
only representatives and class members who were affected within the
forum. These categories are discussed in further detail below.
1. Courts which have refused to apply the Bristol-Myers Squibb
opinion to class actions.
While the Bristol-Myers Squibb analysis requires “an affiliation
between the forum and the underlying controversy,” 164 the first category
of courts has denied application of this analysis to any parties in class
actions. 165 These courts reason that class actions are procedurally distinct
from the mass actions at issue in Bristol-Myers Squibb. 166 So long as
plaintiffs have adequately met the class requirements of Rule 23, 167
Bristol-Myers Squibb should not be applied to class actions. 168 While
163. Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, supra note 8, at 22.
164. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
165. See Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL
4224723 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2017); Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litg., No. 09-2047,
2017 WL 5971622 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017)); Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279,
2018 WL 6460451 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018); Sloan v. General Motors LLC., 287 F. Supp. 3d. 840
(N.D. Cal. 2018); Ochoa v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 5:17-cv-02019, 2018 WL 4998293 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 30, 2018); Tickling Keys v. Transamerica Fin. Advisor Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d. 1342 (M.D. Fla.
2018); Becker v. HBN Media, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2018).
166. See Allen, 2018 WL 6460451, at *6 (“The Supreme Court could not have intended to
severely narrow the forum choices available to class actions plaintiffs when it decided a case
involving a mass action.”); Ochoa, 2018 WL 4998293, at *9 (“However, BMS was not a class action,
it was a mass tort action in state court. This factor alone materially distinguishes [the current case
from Bristol-Myers Squibb] . . . .”). See also Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc.,
No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL 4224723, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017); In re ChineseManufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litg., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *12–17 (E.D. La.
Nov. 30, 2017).
167. For a detailed discussion of the Rule 23 requirements see supra Part II.A.1.
168. Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723 at *5.
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numerous courts have accepted this theory, I would not advance this
approach because named representatives are parties for procedural
purposes, and their personal jurisdiction can be challenged using the
Bristol-Myers Squibb analysis. 169
Two early district court opinions following the Bristol-Myers Squibb
opinion, one from the Northern District of California and the other from
the Eastern District of Louisiana, tended to deny that the opinion had any
applicability to class actions. 170 Just as Justice Sotomayor worried,
defendants attempted to use the opinion to dismiss class action claims on
the basis that the courts did not have personal jurisdiction over defendants
regarding out of state class members’ claims. 171 However, these two
courts did not apply Bristol-Myers Squibb, and a number of courts began
following suit and barred application of the opinion to class actions. 172
Their refusal was grounded in the elementary differences between
the mass actions at the center of the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion and
class actions. First, these courts have routinely noted that the BristolMyers Squibb opinion centered around mass actions and have found this
fact sufficient to warrant not applying the opinion to class action suits.173
Second, class actions are materially different than the mass actions at the
center of Bristol-Myers Squibb. The class certification requirements
outlined in Rule 23 act as due process safeguards in allowing a named
party to represent a possible nationwide class of similarly affected
individuals, whereas these certification requirements are rarely met for
mass actions, requiring each party to be a named party in the action. 174

169. See infra Part III.B.2. There, I discuss application of the opinion to named representatives,
while shielding unnamed class members from a personal jurisdiction analysis.
170. . See Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723, at *3; Chinese-Manufactured Drywall, 2017
WL 5971622, at *12–17.
171. Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723, at *3 (“Dr. Pepper moves to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, or at least over Dr. Pepper as to the
non-California class members.”).
172. See Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litg., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622
(E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017); Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279, 2018 WL 6460451 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 10, 2018); Ochoa v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 5:17-cv-02019, 2018 WL 4998293 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 30, 2018); Tickling Keys v. Transamerica Fin. Advisor Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d. 1342 (M.D.
Fla. 2018); Becker v. HBN Media, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Thompson v.
Transamerica Life Ins. Co., No. 2:18-cv-05422, 2018 WL 6790561, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2018); Gasser
v. Kiss My Face, LLC., No. 17-cv-01675, 2018 WL 4538729 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 21, 2018).
173. See Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litg., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622,
at *2–4 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017).
174. Id. at *14.
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This distinction is critical and warrants not applying the opinion to class
actions. 175
Further, the federalism concerns present in the Bristol-Myers Squibb
opinion are not present in federal class litigation. The Bristol-Myers
Squibb opinion concerned the exercise of a state court’s power over a
controversy that had no connection to the forum. 176 While a federal court
sitting in diversity would still apply substantive state law to a controversy,
these courts have left open whether the opinion applies in federal court.177
Importantly, the In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall court noted that
because traditional choice of law principles and Rule 23’s subclass tool
adequately handle conflicts of law without dismissing the action and
creating multiple suits, these federalism concerns are not present in
federal class actions. 178
In sum, these courts have held that Bristol-Myers Squibb should not
be applied to any parties in class actions. As Judge Eldon E. Fallon noted
in his opinion in In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Products Liability
Litigation: “Bristol Myers Squibb is not a change in controlling due
process law, does not apply to federal class actions, and Congress and the
courts have generally approved of using class actions.” 179 Therefore,
defendants cannot use the opinion to break up and limit potential multistate class actions.
2. Courts which have applied a “hybrid” approach when analyzing
class actions.
The second category of courts have been applying the Bristol-Myers
Squibb opinion to class actions but limiting the analysis to only named
representatives of the class. 180 Courts employing this hybrid approach
have done so because named representatives of a class action are named
parties for procedural purposes, and a personal jurisdiction analysis must
be conducted on their claims. Thus, these courts have adopted a “hybrid”
approach to applying the opinion by dismissing named representatives
175. See Tickling Keys, 305 F. Supp. 3d at 1350–51; Ochao, 2018 WL 4998293, at *10; Allen,
2018 WL 6460451, at *7; Becker, 314 F. Supp. 3d. at 1345.
176. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
177. Allen, 2018 WL 6460451, at *5–6.
178. Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litg., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at
*14 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017).
179. Id. at *21.
180. See Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 741 (N.D. Ill. 2018) [hereafter Al Haj I]; Samsung
Galaxy Smartphone Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 16-cv-06391-BLF, 2018 WL 1576457 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 30, 2018); Reitman v. Champion Petfood USA, Inc., No. CV 18-1736-DOC (JPRx), 2018
WL 4945645 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2018).
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under the rationale but shielding application to unnamed class members.
I propose this is the correct approach to applying the Bristol-Myers Squibb
opinion to class actions.
While only a few courts have advanced this approach, an instructive
case on the hybrid application is Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc. 181 This case
concerned a putative class action in the Northern District of Illinois
wherein two named representatives, Karmel Al Haj and Timothy
Woodhams, brought suit against Pfizer Inc. alleging violations of multiple
states’ consumer protection laws. 182 Pfizer Inc. moved to dismiss plaintiff
Woodhams’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. 183 Pfizer argued lack
of personal jurisdiction related to Woodhams’s claims because
Woodhams was a citizen and resident of Michigan, and the events leading
up to his consumer protection claim all occurred in Michigan. 184 As such,
Illinois could not exercise jurisdiction over his claims. 185 In determining
whether specific jurisdiction existed over Pfizer in regards to
Woodhams’s claims, the court noted that Woodhams had not shown that
there was “a nexus between [Pfizer’s activities in Illinois] and his
injury.” 186 Woodhams’s alleged injury and his contact with Pfizer all
occurred in Michigan, rather than Illinois. 187 Specifically, Woodhams was
a Michigan resident, and he purchased the Robitussin involved in the case
at a market in Michigan. 188 While the case was filed in Illinois, Pfizer’s
contact relating to Woodhams’s claims all occurred in Michigan. 189
The court further rejected any argument that this “nexus” was met
because Woodhams’s claims and injuries were identical to the other
named representative in Illinois. This argument was almost identical to
the one offered by the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers Squibb, and the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that these facts alone created specific
jurisdiction. 190 “The fact that Al Haj ‘sustained the same injury’ as
Woodhams ‘does not allow Illinois to assert specific jurisdiction over
Woodhams’s claims,’ given that Woodhams does not ‘claim to have
suffered harm in Illinois’ and ‘all the conduct giving rise to his claims

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
(2017).
187.
188.
189.
190.

Al Haj I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 741 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 749–50.
Id. at 751–52. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781
Al Haj I, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 747.
Id. at 746.
Id.
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82.
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occurred’ in Michigan.” 191 Finally, the district court believed that
“nothing in [the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion] suggests that it does not
apply to named plaintiffs in a class action; rather, the Court reaffirmed a
generally applicable principle—that due process requires a ‘connection
between the forum and the specific claims at issue.’” 192
The Al Haj court did not initially deal with the issue of applying
Bristol-Myers Squibb to absent class members. However, after successful
use of the opinion to dismiss Woodhams’s claims, Pfizer attempted to
apply the opinion to absent class members in a subsequent briefing. 193
Pfizer argued that the opinion could be used to dismiss the complaints of
absent class members whose claims had no connection to Pfizer’s activity
in Illinois. 194 The court disagreed, siding with the courts that have barred
applying the opinion to non-resident class members. 195 Rather, the court
acknowledged that before Bristol-Myers Squibb, “due process neither
precluded nationwide or multistate class actions nor required the . . .
jurisdictional inquiry urged by Pfizer,” and “Bristol-Myers does not alter
that landscape.” 196 Thus, the opinion was merely “a straightforward
application . . . of settled principles of personal jurisdiction.” 197 While the
opinion could be applied to named representatives, such as Woodhams,
the court believed that the opinion’s application to the absent class
members had simply not been addressed by the Supreme Court and it
could not be applied to the absent class members in the current dispute. 198
Because the Al Haj court applied the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion
to named representatives of the class, but not to absent class members,
this court falls squarely in the hybrid approach; this court recognized the
application of the Bristol-Myers Squibb analysis to named representatives
as procedural parties, 199 yet recognized that the due process safeguards
built into class actions afford absent class members a different
treatment. 200 This rationale has been echoed by the few courts that have

191. Al Haj I, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 752 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82).
192. Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781) (emphasis added); see Greene v.
Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 874–75 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to
named plaintiffs in punitive class action).
193. Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d. 815, 818 (N.D. Ill. 2018) [hereafter Al Haj II].
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 818–19.
197. Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1783).
198. Id. at 819.
199. Al Haj I, 338 F. Supp. 3d. at 752.
200. Al Haj II, 338 F. Supp. 3d. at 819–20.
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applied the analysis to class representatives, yet shielded unnamed class
members. 201
3. Courts which have applied the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion to
all parties in class actions.
The final category of courts has applied the Bristol-Myers Squibb
opinion to all parties in class actions, including absent class members. 202
These courts advance three main theories for doing so: federalism
concerns, challenges to Rule 23 under the Rules Enabling Act (REA), and
forum shopping concerns.
First, certain courts have taken Bristol-Myers Squibb as a signal from
the Supreme Court that federalism concerns prompt the end to the
nationwide class action outside the defendant’s state of general
jurisdiction.203 Just as the Bristol-Myers Squibb Court was concerned
about California courts finding jurisdiction and adjudicating claims that
occurred entirely outside the forum, these courts have been concerned
about the same problems occurring in nationwide class actions.204 These
courts view the ruling as a tool to either limit such nationwide class actions

201. See Samsung Galaxy Smartphone Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 16-cv-06391-BLF,
2018 WL 1576457, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2018) (“Plaintiffs identify no authority where a court
has determined that Bristol-Myers does not apply to a named plaintiff seeking to represent a statewide
class . . . .”); Reitman v. Champion Petfood USA, Inc., No. CV 18-1736-DOC (JPRx), 2018 WL
4945645, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2018) (“This Court finds that Bristol-Myers does apply where, as
here, nonresident class representatives assert state-law claims against nonresident defendants on
behalf of multistate classes . . . .”).
202. See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018);
Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870 (N.D. Ill. 2017); In re Dental Supplies Antitrust
Lit., No. 16 Civ. 696, 2017 WL 4217115 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017); Practice Mgmt. Supp. Services
v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d. 840 (N.D. Ill. 2018); DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17
C 6125, 2018 WL 461228 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018); McDonnell v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC, No.
16 C 5011, 2017 WL 4864910, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C
1948, 2018 WL 2238191 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2018); Wenokur v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No.
CV-17-00165, 2017 WL 4357916 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2017).
203. See DeBernardis, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (based on the Supreme Court’s comments about
federalism . . . the courts will apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to outlaw nationwide class actions in a
form, such as in this case, where there is no general jurisdiction over Defendants); Chavez, 2018 WL
2238191, at *10–11. See, e.g., McDonnell, 2017 WL 4864910, at *4 (“Purchasers of Women’s Alive
[products] who live in Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, or
Washington have no injury arising from Nature’s Way forum-related activities. Instead, any injury
they suffered occurred in the state where they purchased the products.”).
204. DeBernardis, 2018 WL 461228, at *2.
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to the states of general jurisdiction or handle the cases in individual state
class actions where only one applicable law would be applied. 205
The second major argument is a challenge to Rule 23 under the REA.
Under the REA, any of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not
“[A]bridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right [of the parties].” 206
Under this argument, if courts were to accept the notion that Bristol-Myers
Squibb applies only to mass actions rather than class actions, then a
personal jurisdiction analysis regarding the claims of the parties would
change depending on whether the parties are named individually or as
class members. Because parties could avoid personal jurisdiction scrutiny
by filing a class action under Rule 23, this would mean that Rule 23
modifies a substantive right of the defendant and violates the REA. 207
Because a defendant’s due process rights should remain the same whether
the suit is a mass action or class action, these courts have found BristolMyers to be applicable to class actions as a way to comport with the
REA. 208
Finally, these courts are concerned with forum-shopping in filing
federal class actions. 209 The Bristol-Myers Squibb Court was concerned
with forum shopping because the case involved a host of non-resident
plaintiffs attempting to take advantage of California’s law by aggregating
into a state mass action. 210 The courts dealing with class actions believe
that the same concerns are present within federally filed class actions
attempting to utilize advantageous forums. 211 There is no doubt that the
same fears of forum abuse that influenced Congress to pass the Class
Action Fairness Act are still present and pushing judges to begin limiting

205. Chavez, 2018 WL 2238191, at *1 (stating “the Court’s concerns about federalism suggest
that it seeks to bar nationwide class actions in forums where the defendant is not subject to general
jurisdiction”) (internal citations omitted).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).
207. . See, e.g., In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Lit., No. 16 Civ. 696, 2017 WL 4217115, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017) (stating “the constitutional requirements of due process does not wax and
wane when the complaint is individual or on behalf of a class. Personal jurisdiction in class actions
must comport with due process just the same as any other”); Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 17 C 8841,
2018 WL 5311903, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018) (stating that applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to
dismiss claims of nonresident class members “ensures that Rule 23—a rule of procedure subject to
the [REA’s] limitations—does not violated the [REA] by extending the personal jurisdiction of the
federal courts to ‘abridge, enlarge, or modify’ a ‘substantive right’”).
208. Practice Mgmt. Supp. Services v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d. 840, 861 (N.D.
Ill. 2018).
209. DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17 C 6125, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18,
2018).
210. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
211. DeBernardis, 2018 WL 461228, at *2.
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the power of class actions by restricting the nationwide class action to
states of general jurisdiction for the defendant. 212
What is most striking about these opinions is that the early courts
adopting this approach spend very little time illustrating these concerns,
sometimes limiting the justification down to a single sentence in the
opinion. 213 However, citing these courts as precedent, similar courts have
begun to agree and advance the theory that the Bristol-Myers Squibb
opinion can be applied to class actions. 214
C.

Limited Guidance by the Federal Circuit Courts

This divide within the federal district courts has continued to develop
as courts have analyzed the issue through one of the three main categories
detailed above. 215 But as litigants are now struggling to re-direct their
strategy in response this debate, this troublesome question of the opinion’s
application to class actions becomes even more important. 216 As the issue
works through the district courts, there has been limited resolution given
by the federal circuit courts.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently had the opportunity
to wade in on the issue in Beaton v. SpeedyPC when it reviewed a district
court’s order granting class certification to a putative class action against
a software developer. 217 The defendant raised numerous arguments as to
why the certification of the class and individual issues was a mistake, and
also raised the argument that under the Bristol-Myers Squibb ruling, the
district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it regarding the claims of
non-resident class members. 218 However, the defendant had not raised this
issue of personal jurisdiction in their briefings to the district court, thereby
212. Klonoff, supra note 15, at 743–45.
213. . See DeBernardis, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (agreeing with district courts applying BristolMyers Squibb to class actions because of federalism and forum shopping concerns); McDonnell v.
Nature’s Way Products, LLC, No. 16 C 5011, 2017 WL 4864910, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017)
(applying Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion to consumer class action representing out of state class
members without giving justification).
214. See Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C 1948, 2018 WL 2238191 (N.D. Ill. May
16, 2018), at *10 (relying upon Practice Mgmt., DeBernardis, and McDonnell to apply Bristol-Myers
Squibb to class actions); Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL 5311903, at *5–6 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 26, 2018) (relying on arguments from earlier cases in the Northern District of Illinois to
advance the theory that Bristol-Myers Squibb applies to non-resident class members).
215. See, e.g., Murphy & Rowe, supra note 10.
216. See Richard Levick, The Game Changes: Is Bristol-Myers Squibb The End Of An Era?,
FORBES (July 11, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2017/07/11/the-game-changesis-bristol-myers-squibb-the-end-of-an-era/#6bfcfbbb2e83 [https://perma.cc/BQG9-AAM8].
217. Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 2018).
218. Id. at 1024.
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waiving the issue for appeal. 219 The Seventh Circuit therefore refused to
directly consider whether the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion should be
extended to class actions.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals provided the first direct circuit
court guidance on Bristol-Myers Squibb’s application to class actions.
Molock v. Whole Foods Market Inc. involved a class action of Whole
Foods Market employees who brought suit because of the company’s
failure to uphold contractual provisions provided under their employee
“Gainsharing” bonus system. 220 Alongside other arguments in the district
court, Whole Foods challenged the court’s personal jurisdiction on two
grounds. First, Whole Foods argued the court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the claims of two named representatives to the action.221 Second, it
argued the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over it regarding the
non-resident putative class members. 222
In analyzing the claims of the two named representatives, the district
court found that the Bristol-Myers Squibb ruling limited their jurisdiction
to hear their claims. The claims of the named representatives looked
almost identical to the claims at issue in Bristol-Myers Squibb because the
alleged injury did not occur as a result of Whole Foods’s contact with the
District of Columbia, and the only connection these two representatives
had with the forum was that the other plaintiffs were injured by similar
conduct. 223 However, the court did not extend the ruling to the absent class
members after noting key distinctions between class actions and mass
actions. 224 The D.C. district court agreed with the “few courts that have
squarely addressed the issue,” and determined that because class members
are not parties like named parties to a mass action, and because Rule 23
provides additional due process safeguards, Bristol-Myers Squibb should
not be applied to dismiss claims of non-resident class members. 225

219. Id. at 1025 (“Speedy seems to be asking us to extend Bristol-Myers Squibb to nationwide
class actions. While briefing the issue now before us—class certification—in the district court, neither
party raised personal jurisdiction. Thus, we have no need to opine on this question, because it does
not bear directly on our determination.”).
220. . Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120–21 (D.C.C. 2018).
221. Id. at 124.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 124–25 (“Accordingly, because Bowens’s and Strickland’s claim, like those of the
non-resident plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers, arise from conduct outside the forum where they seek to bring
suit, this court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction as to their claims.”).
224. Id. at 126–27.
225. Id. Based off the court’s application to the ruling to the named representatives, but not the
class members, this court would fall squarely into the “hybrid” category I have discussed above, and
advocate in this Note.
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The issue was made final by the court, and Whole Foods appealed
the decision. 226 Briefs by both parties made it clear that determining
whether unnamed class members are parties for personal jurisdiction and
procedural purposes is the central inquiry. 227 The D.C. Circuit sided with
the plaintiffs, agreeing that, prior to class certification under Rule 23,
unnamed class members are not yet parties to the action.228 Using a
“specific application of the more general principle that personal
jurisdiction entails a court’s ‘power over the parties before it,’” 229 the
court found that unnamed class members were not parties prior to
certification. 230 Parties are those who brought the lawsuit or had the
lawsuit brought against or have been joined thorough some intervention
or joinder rule. 231 Prior to certification, class members are simply not
parties before the court—they only become subject to dismissal after the
class has been certified. 232 Because unnamed class members are
nonparties prior to class certification, the court concluded that the
attempted dismissal using the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion is therefore
untimely. 233 This opinion about the status of unnamed class members has

226. Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018).
227. Compare Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 22–25, Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. v. Molock
et al., No. 18-7162 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2019) (arguing that unnamed class members are not parties for
procedural purposes and their claims should not be considered in a personal jurisdiction analysis prior
to certification), with Reply Brief of Appellant at 3–7, Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. v. Molock et al.,
No. 18-7162 (D.C. Cir. May. 10, 2019) (arguing that the party/non-party distinction has no bearing
in a personal jurisdiction analysis and that claims of absent class members can be dismissed under
Bristol-Myers Squibb precedent).
228. Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“Because the
class in this case has yet to be certified, Whole Foods’ motion to dismiss the putative class members
is premature. Only after the putative class members are added to the action—that is, ‘when the action
is certified as a class under Rule 23.’”) (citing Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 940 (9th Cir.
2001)).
229. Molock, 952 F.3d at 298 (citing Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 562
(2017)).
230. Id.
231. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313 (2011) (“In general, a party to litigation is
one by or against whom a lawsuit is brought or one who becomes a party by intervention, substitution,
or third-party practice.”).
232. See In re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The
granting of class certification under Rule 23 authorizes a district court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over unnamed class members who otherwise might be immune to the court’s power.”); Gibson v.
Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] class action, when filed, includes only the
claims of the named plaintiff or plaintiffs. The claims of unnamed class members are added to the
action later, when the action is certified as a class under Rule 23.”).
233. Molock, 952 F.3d at 298. Interestingly, the court implies that the opinion could still be used
to dismiss unnamed parties after certification. Id. (“When the action is certified as a class under Rule
23—should the district court entertain Whole Foods’s motion to dismiss the nonnamed class
members.”) (internal citations omitted).
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provided the first clear authority on the issue. However, the circuits courts
have still yet to address the other three concerns outlined above.
IV. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO ABSENT CLASS
MEMBERS IN CLASS ACTIONS.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb was by no
means an incorrect opinion, and this Note does not advance that notion. It
was an important clarification to the boundaries of specific jurisdiction
and a new addition to the Court’s portfolio of cases detailing personal
jurisdiction. However, applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to limit and break
up class actions outside a defendant’s forum of general jurisdiction has
proven problematic.
Courts applying the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion to absent class
members’ claims have little reason to do so. The three major concerns
cited by these courts—federalism, a violation of the REA, and the dangers
of forum shopping—are already adequately handled by Rule 23; using the
Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion adds nothing new. Shoehorning the opinion
to apply to class actions is a blunt attempt to dismiss class actions unless
they are filed in the defendant’s forum of general jurisdiction. As such,
Bristol-Myers Squibb should not be applied to absent class members in
class action suits.
A.

Federalism Concerns are Not Present in Federal Class Actions.

The federalism concerns present in Bristol-Myers Squibb are not
present in federal class actions, thus negating use of the opinion against
absent class members. California’s exercise of jurisdiction over claims
which had no connection to the forum created a classic federalism concern
because one state was adjudicating claims which happened outside its
borders. 234 Although class actions, by their nature, involve adjudicating
claims in a single forum, federalism concerns are not present because: (1)
class actions must apply the respective law to the class members involved,
and (2) CAFA allows for filing or easy removal of class actions to federal
court to avoid the sway of state courts. As such, the federalism concerns
cited by courts applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to class actions are
insignificant.
First, federalism concerns are already scrutinized as a component in
the class certification process. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the

234.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
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Constitution through Erie, 235 Klaxon Co, 236 and Shutts 237 has created three
major foundations: federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the
substantive law of the forum where they sit 238; choice of law rules are
substantive rules of the forum state 239; and states cannot apply their
substantive laws to conduct that occurs outside their borders, even in class
actions filed in the forum. 240 Under the REA, district courts cannot use the
class device to “negate or make it impossible for one or more of the parties
to assert otherwise available claims and defenses” under state law. 241
So what do these principles mean together? These principles hold
that although class actions seek to represent class members from multiple
forums, courts are restrained from applying one law to the entire class,
and the appropriate substantive law will be applied to each respective
class member. Taking these restraints together, there is very little concern
for a federalism issue being present in a federally filed class action. Recall
that the mass action plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers Squibb attempted to take
advantage of the substantive state laws of California even though their
claims did not result from the defendant’s contact with California. 242
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the state court’s exercise
of jurisdiction over conduct which did not occur there would pose a
federalism issue, violating principles of due process and personal
jurisdiction. Because district courts cannot apply one substantive law to
an entire class in a class action, class action suits are wholeheartedly and
procedurally different from the situation that arose in Bristol-Myers
Squibb.
This safeguard is demonstrated through the rigorous choice of law
analysis that must be conducted at the class certifications stage. Rule
23(a)(2) requires that for a class to be certified, there must be questions of
law or fact common to the class, and 23(b)(3) requires that there must be
“questions of law or fact common to class members [that] predominate
over any questions affecting individual members.” 243 Because multiple
laws would have to be applied to each member, this forces district courts
to conduct a choice of law analysis by identifying which state laws would
be applied to the class members, identifying the substantial issues of the
235. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
236. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
237. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985).
238. . Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
239. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496–97.
240. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823.
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).
242. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017).
243. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3).
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case, and conducting a state-by-state survey on how those legal issues
would be affected by each state’s laws. 244
This choice of law analysis embedded in Rule 23 adds two
safeguards to protect against federalism concerns. First, because a
certified class action must apply the respective state laws to each class
member, there is little worry that the court would be handling a case where
a single substantive law would be applied to controversies that occurred
outside the forum. Second, if a choice of law analysis reveals that there is
too great a difference in state laws, the class will be decertified, thus
negating any concern over the court handling the case in the first place. 245
To illustrate this point, suppose that a consumer in State A is injured
by the tortious conduct of a corporate defendant headquartered in State B.
Consumer files a class action in the appropriate federal court under
diversity jurisdiction and seeks to certify a nationwide class of all those
injured by the defendant’s negligence. As shown, a rigorous choice of law
analysis must be done during the certification stage, and a survey of the
potential laws to be applied to the respective class members must be
conducted. The substantive tort law of State A can only be applied to those
class members who were injured in State A; for all other states, the
respective state laws will be applied to those controversies. It is at this
point that “predominance” of the common issue of law or fact is
determined. In this hypothetical, there is no federalism concern implicated
by this procedure. Even though the class members’ claims are being
handled in a central forum, State A is still respecting due process by
applying the respective laws to each controversy or decertifying the class
if it does not meet 23(a)(2) or (b)(3) requirements.
Additionally, Rule 23’s subclass mechanism also adequately handles
potential federalism problems. Rule 23(c)(5) allows the district courts to

244. Holly Kershell, An Approach to Certification Issues in Multi-State Diversity Class Actions
in Federal Court After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 40 USF L. REV. 769, 783 (2006).
245. Id. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 228 F.3d 1012, 1015, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (“No class
action is proper unless all litigants are governed by the same legal rules. Otherwise the class cannot
satisfy the commonality and superiority requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(3) . . . . Because
these claims must be adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions, a single nationwide class is
not manageable.”); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Given the
multiplicity of individualized factual and legal issues, magnified by choice of law considerations, we
can by no means conclude ‘that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.’”); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[A] district court must consider how variation in state law affect
predominance and superiority . . . . In a multi-state class action, variation in state law may swamp any
common issues and defeat predominance.”); Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718,
728 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating “[T]he law on predominance requires the district court to consider
variations in state law when a class action involves multiple jurisdictions.”).
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create “subclasses” which are treated like individual classes. 246 As the
Eleventh Circuit held in Klay v. Humana, Inc., it is theoretically possible
to take a nationwide class and break it into a series of subclasses which
meet certification requirements. 247 Therefore, if a nationwide class faces
a conflict of substantive state laws, the class could be broken up into a
series of subclasses that aggregate similar state laws together. Just as the
requirements of class certification are the plaintiff’s initial burden, the
plaintiff must also demonstrate to the court that subclasses are
appropriate. This is shown through a rigorous analysis “establishing
appropriate subclasses and demonstrating that each subclass meets the
Rule 23 requirements . . . the plaintiffs must come forward with the exact
definition of each subclass, its representatives, and the reasons each
subclass meets the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and (b).” 248
Looking back to our earlier illustration, Consumer’s class action may
be able to utilize subclasses by showing that the multiple states’ laws
applicable to the class members could be grouped into similar subclasses.
Therefore, each class would be given a representative, and the plaintiff
would have to demonstrate that the subclass standing alone meets Rule
23’s requirements. So, the nationwide class could be broken up into a
series of subclasses that group either the common issues of fact (Product
A, Product B, Product C subclasses) or the common laws shared among
the class (Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania subclasses).
While Bristol-Myers Squibb presented an interstate federalism
problem, this concern has no application to class actions because a class
action must meet a host of due process safeguards to be certified. A choice
of law survey will be conducted, and the respective substantive law will
be applied to each class member, so long as a common issue of fact or law
is shared among the entire class. The sub-classing tool can further be
utilized to ensure due process is not offended through maintenance of the
suit.
Thus, the federalism concern presented in Bristol-Myers Squibb is
simply not present in federally filed class actions. There is no concern of
a state court overreaching its judicial boundaries in a class action;
Supreme Court precedent and Rule 23 limit courts from applying a single
substantive law to all members of a class action, and potential class actions
with large substantive law conflicts will likely not be granted certification
in the first place.
246. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5).
247. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004).
248. Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing In re
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 203, 221 (S.D. Ohio 1996)).
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The Rules Enabling Act Will Not Be Violated

The second major challenge to class actions using the Bristol-Myers
Squibb holding comes from a challenge to Rule 23 under the Rules
Enabling Act. While Bristol-Myers Squibb was first and foremost about
personal jurisdiction, the opinion has been shoehorned into class action
litigation by arguing that there is a procedural difference between class
actions and mass actions. As the Practice Management Support court
noted, because a personal jurisdiction analysis would not be conducted on
all the absent class members in a class action, this arguably modifies a
substantive right of the defendant and violates the Rules Enabling Act. 249
It would therefore follow that these courts believe that Rule 23, as a
complete mechanism, violates the REA.
This argument fails to recognize the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of challenges to the Rules Enabling Act and Rule 23. Illustrative on this
point is the Court’s most recent Erie doctrine case: Shady Grove
Orthopedic Association v. Allstate Insurance Co. In Shady Grove, the
Supreme Court entertained a challenge to Rule 23 when a series of lower
courts struggled to apply a New York statute, CPLR § 901, which could
dismiss class actions even though the Rule 23 requirements had been
met. 250 This conflict eventually wound its way to the Supreme Court,
where the Court reinforced the validity of Rule 23 under the Rules
Enabling Act. 251
The Court noted that when analyzing statutory challenges to the
Federal Rules, the federal power to prescribe the rules of procedure has
always been reinforced so long as the rule regulates matters “rationally
capable of classification as procedure.” 252 This comes with the restriction
that the rule being challenged must comport with the Rules Enabling Act,
i.e. it must not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right [of the
parties].” 253 While there have been multiple challenges to the Rules of
Civil Procedure under the REA, the Court has adopted a restrictive
reading of the statute.
The language of the Rules Enabling Act has been interpreted to hold
that for a rule to be valid, it must “really regulat[e] procedure—the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and
for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infarction of
249. Practice Mgmt. Supp. Services v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d. 840, 861 (N.D.
Ill. 2018).
250. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 397 (2010).
251. Id. at 409.
252. Id. at 406 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)).
253. Id. at 407 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018)).
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them.” 254 Using this standard, the Court has consistently rejected every
statutory challenge to the Federal Rules. 255 This is because, technically,
every federal court rule has some effect on the substantive rights of the
parties involved. But as the Shady Grove Court noted: “each [rule]
undeniably regulated on the process for enforcing those rights; none
altered the rights themselves, the available remedies, or the rules of
decision by which the court adjudicated either.” 256
With this background, the Shady Grove Court held that Rule 23 did
not violate the Rules Enabling Act. Broadly speaking, Federal Rules
which allow multiple claims to be litigated together (Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
18, 20, and 42) are valid because they do not alter “separate entitlements
to relief nor abridge defendants’ rights . . . .” 257 Rather, the rules modify
“how the claims are processed.” 258 Because Rule 23 (which can be viewed
as a complicated form of joinder) only modifies how a claim involving
multiple plaintiffs against a single defendant is processed, the Court found
that Rule 23 did not violate the Rules Enabling Act.259
Turning to our current analysis, the courts which have applied
Bristol-Myers Squibb to absent class members in class actions have
brought forth a similar statutory challenge to Rule 23. As the Practice
Management Support court argued, Bristol-Myers Squibb laid the
foundation that the due process stops nonresident plaintiffs—whose
claims do not relate to the defendant’s in-forum conduct—from joining
and aggregating claims with an in-forum resident. 260 Therefore, if a
personal jurisdiction analysis must be conducted regarding all plaintiffs in
a mass action (as in Bristol-Myers Squibb), this should not change if the
action is instead a class action and the additional plaintiffs are unnamed
class members. If a personal jurisdiction analysis is not conducted on all

254. Id. (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464;
Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987).
255. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407. The Shady Grove Court noted how numerous challenges to
Federal Rules have failed under this standard. These include methods for serving process under
Federal Rule 4, requiring litigants to submit for mental or physical examination under Federal Rule
35, the imposition of sanctions for filing frivolous appeals under Federal Rule Appellate Procedure
38, and sanctions for those who sign court papers without a reasonable inquiry into the facts asserted
under Federal Rule 11.
256. Id. at 407–08.
257. Id. at 408.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Practice Mgmt. Supp. Services v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d. 840, 861 (N.D.
Ill. 2018) (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017)).
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parties, including absent class members outside the forum, then this would
violate the Rules Enabling Act. 261
While this argument seems to implicate a serious modification of a
defendant’s due process rights in a class action, it fails to recognize the
analysis applied in Shady Grove. Again, when the Federal Rules are
challenged under the Rules Enabling Act, the Act invalidates a rule which
“. . . alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate
[those] rights.’” 262 If a rule only regulates the manner and means by which
litigants rights’ are enforced, then the rule is valid under the Act.263 In
application, Rule 23 does not modify any due process rights of a potential
defendant because the action is filed as a class action, rather than a mass
action.
First, for a class action to be filed in federal court, the defendant must
still have personal jurisdiction in the selected forum in relation to the
named representatives’ claims. 264 If the defendant lacks personal
jurisdiction in relation to the named representatives’ claims, then those
claims will be dismissed, just as if the action were filed as a mass action.265
If the class has no named representative in the forum, certification is
impossible. 266 This rule is demonstrated by the courts applying the
“hybrid” approach and scrutinizing the personal jurisdiction over
defendant regarding named representatives’ claims. 267
Second, Rule 23 merely modifies the manner in which a defendant’s
due process rights are enforced. While a personal jurisdiction analysis is
not performed on all absent class members to the action, a defendant’s due
process rights are still protected through the certification requirements of
Rule 23. The requirements of Rule 23(a) act as constitutional safeguards
for class members because they ensure that due process is not offended by
taking an individual plaintiff’s claim and instead binding him to a class of

261. Id.
262. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (citing Mississippi Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
446 (1946)).
263. Id.
264. See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:25 (5th ed.) (“A putative class representative
seeking to hale a defendant into court to answer to the class must have personal jurisdiction over that
defendant just like any individual litigant must.”).
265. See, e.g., id.
266. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)–(a)(4) (Requiring representatives to represent the class with
similar claims).
267. See Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 120–21 (D.D.C. 2018); Al
Haj I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 741, at 752–753 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp.
3d 870, 874–75 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
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those who are similarly situated.268 In turn, these constitutional safeguards
protect defendants as well. Because all certification requirements have to
be met to certify a class, a defendant will not be asked to litigate and
defend a class action if the proposed class does not meet the 23(a) and
(b)(3) requirements. 269 This ensures that only the “worthy” class actions
will avoid the normal personal jurisdiction analysis. Theoretically,
because the normal personal jurisdiction analysis is supplemented with
the class requirements of Rule 23, the certifying and maintenance of a
class would not infringe upon the “notions of fair play and substantial
justice” that form a defendant’s due process rights. 270
In sum, the argument that Rule 23 modifies a substantive right of the
defendant to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction over all the parties does
not hold water. First, the Supreme Court in Shady Grove has already
reinforced the validity of Rule 23 under the Rules Enabling Act. Second,
Rule 23 merely alters the manner in which this right can be enforced; a
defendant may still dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction regarding the
named representative(s) and challenge that certification requirements
have been met. Therefore, a defendant’s due process interests are still
protected whether the claim is a class action or not.
C.

Forum Shopping in Class Actions are Adequately Handled by other
Mechanisms

The final concern is that the Bristol-Myers Squibb analysis must be
applied to all parties in class actions due to forum shopping concerns. In
Bristol-Myers Squibb, forum shopping was a major concern of the
Supreme Court. Bristol-Myers Squibb concerned an aggregated group of
plaintiffs, some of whom were residents of California, and most of whom
were non-residents. 271 The “mass” action was filed in the State of
California against the same defendant, and every plaintiff asserted claims
under California law. 272 The Court made this fact the center of its
argument, noting that “what is missing [in this case]—is a connection
268. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierre, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 182 n.27 (3d
Cir. 2001) (explaining that the Rule 23 certification perquisites demonstrates that it would not offend
due process to commence the action without the class members being present. “The rule thus
represents a measured response to the issues of how the [D]ue [P]rocess rights of absentee interests
can be protected and how absentees’ represented status can be reconciled with a litigation system
premised on traditional bipolar litigation.”).
269. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–23(b).
270. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that “notions of fair
play and substantial justice” form the due process rights of the defendant).
271. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017).
272. Id.
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between the forum and the specific claims at issue.” 273 Thus, while the
entire group of aggregated plaintiffs could have brought a combined suit
in the defendant’s forums of general jurisdiction (New York or Delaware),
such an action could not take advantage of the laws of California, at least
not for the entire group of plaintiffs. 274
In applying the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion to class actions, the
DeBernardis court noted: “there is also the issue of forum shopping . . .
possible forum shopping is just as present in multi-state class actions.” 275
However, this forum shopping concern is also noted by courts refusing to
apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to class actions by demonstrating that the
forum shopping concerns are not usually present in class actions and
complex litigation. 276 It would seem that courts are split on just how
prevalent forum shopping is in class litigation.
Forum shopping in class actions is already adequately handled by
two mechanisms previously mentioned in this Note. First, class actions
have built-in mechanisms to handle differences in state laws. Thus, class
members cannot take advantage of favorable state law if the action were
filed as a class action. This is because class actions cannot apply one law
to the entire class, and a rigorous choice of law analysis is done during the
certification stage to apply these state laws to the individual class
members. 277 Second, the Class Action Fairness Act—created to combat
class action forum shopping in state courts—makes it far easier to mitigate
forum shopping by removing class actions to federal courts. 278 By
reworking federal court diversity standards for class actions, the majority
of significant class actions with minimal diversity of parties and an
amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000 will gain access to the
federal courts and avoid advantageous state forums.
First, as previously discussed in Part IV.1., the built-in mechanisms
to class actions make it difficult for potential class members to take
advantage of forum shopping. 279 While federal courts sitting in diversity
must apply the laws of the state where they lie, the Supreme Court has
273. Id. at 1781.
274. See, e.g., id. at 1783.
275. DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17 C 6125, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18,
2018).
276. In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liab. Litig., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL
5971622, at *16. (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017).
277. See supra Part IV.1.
278. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(2)(A)–(C) (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1711–
1715 (2018); see also supra notes 58–59.
279. See supra Part IV.1. (discussing why federalism concerns are not present in federal class
actions because class actions have been designed so that one state cannot apply a single substantive
law to every class member in the controversy).
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held that in the context of a nationwide class action, a state cannot impose
its substantive laws onto claims which did not occur within its borders. 280
This holding facilitates a rigorous choice of law analysis to be conducted
at some point in the class certification stage of the action, and class
members would be sorted into respective groups based on the state law to
be applied to them. 281 Under this view, forum shopping is likely a nonexistent danger to class actions; because an application of respective state
law is done for each group of class members, it is impossible for a class
member to take advantage of the laws of another forum—his state’s law
will be applied to his controversy.
With respect to forum shopping for advantageous class certification
standards, the Class Action Fairness Act made forum shopping
significantly harder. As previously mentioned, CAFA expanded the
federal court jurisdiction over class actions by making it easier to file or
remove class actions to federal courts. 282 As evident by Congressional
records, CAFA was passed as a way to combat forum shopping for
advantageous state courts and filing nationwide class actions in those
courts. 283 With passage of CAFA, the majority of significant class actions
can now be filed or removed to federal court to avoid the sway of
advantageous state courthouses. 284 It should be noted that CAFA was
passed due to concerns with forum shopping in state courts, so the ability
to seek out federal forums has drastically cut down on litigants hunting
for advantageous forums to file.
Finally, some amount of forum shopping for courts with
advantageous certification standards is inevitable in class actions. With
the federal courts having been granted greater jurisdiction to hear class
actions, and appellate review under Rule 23(f), a series of advantageous
circuits to file have emerged based on differences in interpreting the rule’s
certification requirements. 285 Take for example, the differing
requirements for numerosity under Rule 23. Rule 23 requires that for a
class action to be filed, the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all

280. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985).
281. See supra Part IV.1.
282. See supra Part II.B. (describing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 as a major milestone
in curbing forums selection in state courts).
283. See S. REP. No. 109-14 at 10–21 (2005) (the Senate report noted concerns for lawyers
“playing” the system by maneuvering around diversity requirements and filing class actions in
advantageous state courts. This facilitated an act by Congress to rework federal court diversity
requirements to allow for easier removal by defendants in class actions.).
284. Klonoff, supra note 13, at 745.
285. Id. at 828.
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members is impracticable.” 286 However, as Robert Klonoff notes in The
Decline of Class Actions, what was once the “least demanding
requirement of Rule 23 (a)” now has heightened scrutiny given by certain
circuit courts. 287 Courts have diverged on how much evidence is needed
to demonstrate numerosity: can the certifying court simply rely on
common sense and assumptions based off the class complaint, or does it
need hard evidence that the number of people involved in the class meets
numerosity standards? 288 While topics like these are collateral to this
Note—and worthy of their own separate discussions—it suffices to
understand that these splits have emerged for almost every prerequisite of
Rule 23. 289 As such, it is inevitable that, based off the underlying facts and
legal issues at hand, certain class actions will seek out more advantageous
forums to file.
However, these differences can be corrected as caselaw on class
certification continues to develop in the federal circuits. As Klonoff
further states, “On some issues, courts can alter their approach as a matter
of caselaw. On other issues—those on which the Supreme Court has
rendered a decision or where there is an unresolved conflict among the
circuits—a rule change may be required.” 290 Thus, these splits will only
begin to be corrected as class action caselaw continues to develop in the
circuit courts. This solution will take time and continued study; something
which would be severely cut short through application of Bristol-Myers
Squibb to immediately bar most nationwide class action.
V. CONCLUSION
New challenges have reshaped the practice of class actions, and the
list of new challenges far exceeds what could be analyzed in one Note.
However, applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to class actions is a small, yet
worrisome trend that should be addressed. Should the opinion be applied
to absent class members in class actions, it would bring a whole new
challenge that was not previously required; a personal jurisdiction
286. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
287. Klonoff, supra note 15, at 773.
288. Id. at 768–73 (Klonoff conducts a thorough analysis of the federal district and circuit courts
to conclude there is a split based off of how much concrete evidence courts require to determine that
the class is so numerous that traditional joinder would not be practicable).
289. See, e.g., Klonoff supra note 15, at 761–68 (detailing heightened requirements for class
definition); id. at 768–73 (detailing heightened requirements for numerosity); id. at 773–80 (detailing
heightened requirements for commonality); Id. at 780–88 (detailing heightened requirements for
representation); id. at 792–99 (detailing heightened requirements for predominance based off of the
type of claims involved).
290. Id. at 829.
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challenge which would arguably go against the very purpose of the class
tool in the first place. As litigants eagerly await circuit authority on the
issue, the application of Bristol-Myers Squibb must be addressed to
preserve the widespread utility gained from class actions under Rule 23.
A first-year law student can open their rulebook and tell you that Rule 23
requires no personal jurisdiction analysis of class members—and it should
remain this way. The class action should be preserved as it was imagined;
a way for the harmed masses to efficiently organize against the wrong
doer, for the many to stand against the few, and to ensure that justice is
efficient and fair. Otherwise the “parade of horribles” originally dismissed
by the Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb may soon come to
fruition. 291

291.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1783 (2017).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/8

46

